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UNITED STATES V SMITH: AN EXAMPLE TO OTHER
COURTS FOR HOW THEY SHOULD APPROACH
EYEWITNESS EXPERTS
Maureen Stoneman+
In 2000, after Frank Lee Smith spent fourteen years on death row for the
murder of eight-year-old Shandra Whitehead, he was exonerated by DNA
evidence.' Smith had been wrongly convicted based primarily on the
misidentification by two eyewitnesses.2  Unfortunately, Smith's exoneration
occurred eleven months after he died of cancer on death row.3  This
miscarriage of justice provides yet another example of what occurs all too
often: convictions based on the inaccuracy of eyewitness identification.4 Juries
rely heavily upon eyewitness identifications, as proven by studies
demonstrating that jurors rely on such testimony even though it is often
wrong.5
To combat this issue, defense counsel have sought to introduce experts to
testify regarding the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony and the factors that
often affect an eyewitness's perception and memory.6 Prosecutors have
objected to such expert testimony,7 asserting either that such witnesses do not
meet the requirements that experts must meet in order to testify under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702)8 or that, even if such witnesses do qualify as
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S.,
2008, John Carroll University. The author wishes to thank Professor Cara Drinan for her
guidance and insight. The author also wishes to thank her family for their love and support.
1. Amy Driscoll, Lesley Clark & Charles Savage, DNA Test Clears 'Killer' After His
Death; Man Spent Years on Death Row, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15, 2000, at 1A.
2. Id. at 2A. The first eyewitness was the victim's mother who testified that she had seen
Smith standing outside her home on the night of the murder, and the second eyewitness was a
woman who testified that as she drove past the victim's home on the night of the murder, Smith
signaled her to stop and asked her for fifty cents. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 1-2, Smith
v. Florida, 708 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1997) (No. 78,199).
3. Driscoll, Clark & Savage, supra note 1, at Al.
4. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523-24 (2004) (discussing the high number of persons exonerated
from 1989 through 2003 who were convicted based on eyewitness misidentification).
5. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 123-24 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the weight that juries give
eyewitness testimony, even eyewitness testimony that defense counsel proves is inaccurate).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1208-09 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(allowing defense counsel to introduce an expert to discuss factors that affect eyewitness
testimony, such as confidence, cross-racial identifications, stress, and post-event conditions).
7. See, e.g., id
8. See, e.g., id; see also FED. R. EVID. 702; United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th
Cir. 1996).
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experts and can testify under Rule 702, such experts violate Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 (Rule 403) because the prejudice that the testimony creates
substantially outweighs its probative value.9
Rule 702 outlines the requirements that expert testimony must meet in order
to be admitted at trial.' 0 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
Supreme Court, for the first time, interpreted Rule 702 and decided what
standards expert testimony must meet in order to be admissible.'1  Daubert
held that even if an expert witness is found to satisfy Rule 702, his testimony
can still be excluded under Rule 403.12 Rule 403 permits exclusion of
otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."1 3
Prior to Daubert, some courts uniformly excluded expert testimony
regarding the reliability of eyewitnesses.14 However, by setting out specific
guidelines for determining the admissibility of expert testimony, Daubert
seems to prohibit a blanket exclusion of an entire group of expert witnesses.15
Therefore, post-Daubert courts have applied the Daubert guidelines to
determine whether expert-eyewitness testimony is admissible under Rule 702,
and, if it is admissible, then courts conduct a balancing test under Rule 403 to
9. See, e.g., Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; see also FED. R. EVID. 403; United States v.
Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1999).
10. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 states:
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-89, 592 (1993) (stating that in
order to admit expert testimony the testimony must, in addition to being relevant under Federal
Rule of Evidence 402, (1) be scientific knowledge, and (2) aid the jury in determining the issue
presented).
12. Id. at 595.
13. FED. R. EVID. 403.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (stating that it
would not consider whether the district court improperly excluded expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitnesses because such testimony is not admissible in the Eleventh Circuit).
15. United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (interpreting
Dauberi as a prohibition against a blanket exclusion of a whole body of expert testimony); see
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (holding that courts should examine each case individually to
systematically apply the factors set out in the opinion, rather than coming to conclusions prior to
applying the factors).
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determine whether any danger of prejudice or confusion that the testimony
might cause substantially outweighs the probative value of such testimony.' 6
Courts have reached mixed outcomes on the admissibility of
eyewitness-expert testimony under Rules 702 and 403. Nearly every
jurisdiction has held that the decision to admit or exclude eyewitness-expert
testimony is within the discretion of the trial court.19 Courts are becoming
increasingly receptive to eyewitness-expert testimony as scientific knowledge
that is admissible under Rule 702.20 However, even if they find that such
testimony constitutes scientific knowledge, many courts continue to exclude
eyewitness-expert testimony under Rule 702 because they do not believe that
such testimony aids the trier of fact.21
Additionally, although a few courts have held that eyewitness-expert
testimony should not be excluded under Rule 403 because it provides juries
with a more complete picture and allows jurors to make better-informed and
more accurate decisions,22 many courts have found that eyewitness experts
cause unfair prejudice and confusion by interfering with the role of the jury in
23determining witness credibility, and have thus excluded such testimony.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 338-40 (3d Cir. 2001) (deciding that
the expert evidence could be admitted under Rule 702, and then deciding that the testimony did
not violate Rule 403 and could therefore be admitted).
17. In this Note, "eyewitness-expert testimony" is used as shorthand for expert testimony on
the reliability of eyewitnesses.
18. Compare Mathis, 264 F.3d at 335-38 (finding that the eyewitness expert's testimony
could not be excluded under Rule 702 because the evidence aided the trier of fact), with United
States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883-84 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the eyewitness expert did not
satisfy Rule 702 because the evidence offered by the eyewitness expert was not scientific
knowledge, nor did such evidence aid the trier of fact); compare United States v. Smithers, 212
F.3d 306, 315-17 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that eyewitness-expert testimony should not have been
excluded under Rule 403), with Kime, 99 F.3d at 884 (holding that the dangers of prejudice and
confusion that eyewitness-expert testimony would cause the jury substantially outweighed any
benefit of such testimony, and the evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312
(5th Cir. 1986).
20. See Moore, 786 F.2d at 1312 (noting that recent courts were more willing to accept
eyewitness-expert testimony as scientific knowledge). However, even after Moore noted this
change, courts have continued to exclude eyewitness-expert testimony on the grounds that it is
not scientific knowledge. See, e.g., Kime, 99 F.3d at 883.
21. See, e.g., Kime, 99 F.3d at 884.
22. See Mathis, 264 F.3d at 340; Smithers, 212 F.3d at 315-16; United States v. Smith, 736
F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (avoiding discussion of Rule 403, but nevertheless stating that eyewitness
experts have a high probative value in that they provide the jury with a more complete picture of
eyewitness identification).
23. See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1999); Kime, 99 F.3d at
883-84; United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992).
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In United States v. Smith,24 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama held that the value of eyewitness-expert testimony far
outweighs any prejudice or confusion that it causes.25 In Smith, the court
systematically and convincingly stated why eyewitness experts aid the judicial
process rather than detract from it.26
This Note examines United States v. Smith. First, this Note discusses the
inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony and the weight that juries give to such
testimony. Second, this Note examines the history of expert witness testimony
and the rules governing who can testify and when expert witnesses can be
excluded. Third, this Note reviews the case law dealing with the admissibility
of eyewitness experts and the factors courts have considered in deciding
whether to admit or, much more often, exclude eyewitness-expert testimony.
Finally, this Note concludes that there is a great need for eyewitness experts in
the justice system. United States v. Smith is a typical case where
eyewitness-expert testimony was at issue. However, the court in Smith
responded with an atypical holding by admitting the eyewitness-expert
testimony. Although Smith is not the first case to admit eyewitness-expert
testimony, it is an excellent example of a court considering the research on the
reliability of eyewitnesses, applying the law and the research to the facts and
comprehensively explaining why the expert eyewitness testimony should be
admitted. Most courts have ruled that the decision to admit or exclude
eyewitness-expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court. This
Note argues that too many trial courts exclude eyewitness-expert testimony
where it should be admitted; therefore, appellate courts grant trial courts too
much discretion in excluding eyewitness-expert testimony. All courts should
follow the Smith court's approach toward eyewitness-expert testimony. Courts
should recognize that eyewitness experts meet the requirements set out in Rule
702, and, in most situations, rather than causing confusion and prejudice in
violation of Rule 403, eyewitness experts can play a critical role by providing
the jury with a more accurate and complete basis on which to assess the
reliability of an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator.
24. The primary case of this Note is United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (M.D.
Ala. 2009), a decision by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama that
systematically lays out the case for the necessity of eyewitness-expert testimony. This case
should not be confused with United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1984), a Sixth
Circuit decision that held that the district court erred in excluding eyewitness-expert testimony, or
with United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1360 (11 th Cir. 1997), an Eleventh Circuit decision
that held that it was within the district court's discretion to admit or exclude eyewitness-expert
testimony. Neither should these cases be confused with the opening story regarding Frank Lee
Smith. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. All four of these Smith defendants are different
people, unconnected to one another.
25. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1220-21.
26. See id at 1214-17, 1220-21.
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I. THE ROLE OF EYEWITNESS EXPERTS IN THE COURTROOM
A. Inaccuracy ofand Reliance on Eyewitness Testimony
In 2004, researchers at the University of Michigan compiled data regarding
post-conviction exonerations in the United States between 1989 and 2003; they
found 340 exonerations within this fifteen-year period. 27 Sixty-four percent of
those defendants exonerated were wrongly identified by at least one
eyewitness as the person who committed the crime.28 The researchers found
that "[t]he most common cause of wrongful convictions [was] eyewitness
misidentification."29
There are nearly five times more robberies committed each year than
forcible rapes. 30 Yet, the University of Michigan study found that out of the
exonerations of those who were convicted based on misidentifications, 107 of
them had been convicted of forcible rape, while only six of them had been
convicted of robbery. ' The study points out that it is unlikely that there are
32that many more misidentifications in rape cases than in robbery cases. In
fact, the researchers argue that the results should be the opposite due to how
many more robberies occur each year than rapes, the fact that victims are
much more likely to know their assailants in rape offenses than they are in
robbery offenses, 34 and the fact that victims usually have a longer period of
exposure and a better view of the perpetrators during rape offenses than during
robbery offenses. However, persons who were convicted of rape based on
misidentifications were exonerated at a rate of about eighteen times that of
those who were convicted of robbery based on misidentification.36
This anomaly exists because DNA evidence is so often available in rape
cases, but not in robbery cases.37  Therefore, although DNA evidence has
27. Gross et al., supra note 4, at 523-24.
28. Id at 524.
29. Id at 542.
30. Compare Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Forcible Rape, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
2008 (Sept. 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/violent crime/forcible rape.html
(estimating 89,000 forcible rapes in 2008), with Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Robbery, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2008 (Sept. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/
violentcrime/robbery.html (estimating 441,855 robberies in 2008).
31. Gross et al., supra note 4, at 530.
32. Id at 530-31.
33. Id at 530.
34. Id; see MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 at 5 (2009), available at http://www.ojp.us
doj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf (finding that in 2008, seventy percent of forcible rape offenses
were committed by someone the victim knew, while only forty-two percent of robberies were
committed by someone the victim knew).
35. Gross et al, supra note 4, at 530.
36. See id
37. Id at 531.
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corrected some of the errors that misidentifications have caused, it does not
help with those crimes where little DNA evidence is usually left behind at the
crime scene. The researchers stated, "[i]f we had a technique for detecting
false convictions in robberies that was comparable to DNA identification for
rapes, robbery exonerations would greatly outnumber rape exonerations, and
the total number of falsely convicted defendants who were exonerated would
be several times what we report." 39
Despite evidence that eyewitness identifications are unreliable and lead to
vast numbers of wrongful convictions, jurors rely heavily upon eyewitness
identification testimony.40 in one study, researchers divided students into three
groups of jurors in a criminal prosecution.4 1 All groups received the same fact
pattern regarding a robbery of a grocery store.42 The researchers told the first
group that there were no eyewitnesses to the crime; the researchers told the
second group that the store clerk had identified the defendant as the robber,
and the defense attorney merely argued that the eyewitness was wrong; and the
researchers told the third group that the store clerk had identified the defendant
as the robber, but that the defense attorney had proven that the store clerk was
not wearing his glasses at the time of the crime and could not possibly have
seen the defendant's face.43 Eighty-two percent of the first group, which did
not have an eyewitness, acquitted the defendant. 44 Conversely, seventy-two
percent of those in the second group who heard from an eyewitness convicted
the defendant. 45 Sixty-eight percent of those in the third group convicted the
defendant despite defense counsel successfully discrediting the eyewitness.46
In other words, without the e ewitness testimony only eighteen percent of
jurors convicted the defendant. However, when an eyewitness testified, even
one who was discredited by the defense, the conviction rate more than
48
tripled. Therefore, research has shown that eyewitness identifications, even
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15
JURIMETRICS J. 188, 188-90 (1975).





46. Id. at 189-90.
47. Id. at 189.
48. Id. Similarly, in another study, researchers separated participants into different groups.
Joanna D. Pozzulo et al., The Influence ofEyewitness Identification Decisions and Age of Witness
on Jurors' Verdicts and Perceptions of Reliability, 12 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 641, 645 (2006).
Each group received a trial transcript from a trial where the defendant was accused of stealing a
car that he later used in a bank robbery. Id. The transcripts were identical except regarding
whether the eyewitness was able to accurately identify the defendant as the person he saw stealing
the car. Id. One group of participants received a transcript where the eyewitness picked the
defendant out of a line-up as the person he saw stealing the car. Id Another group received a
538 [Vol. 60:533
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eyewitness identifications that are shown to be faulty, are highly influential to
-49jurors.
As prominent researchers in eyewitness identification have stated, "[flew
moments are more dramatic than when a courtroom witness, upon questioning
by the prosecutor, extends an arm, points a finger, and declares with rock-solid
certainty that the accused is the person she saw fleeing the scene of the crime
with bloodied hands."50 Evidently, this type of identification is incredibly
convincing to jurors despite the inaccuracy of such identifications.
B. The Use ofEyewitness Experts at Trial
Defense counsel have sought to combat the weight that juries give
eyewitness testimony by having eyewitness experts, usually psychologists who
specialize in memory or perception, testify at trial regarding the factors that
affect memory and perception and therefore often prove eyewitness
identification unreliable.52
Rule 702 governs who can testify as an expert witness and when expert
testimony is allowed. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
transcript where the eyewitness was unable to pick the defendant out of a line-up and thus
identified no one as the perpetrator. Id. A third group received a transcript where the eyewitness
did not pick the defendant out of the line-up and instead chose someone out of the line-up known
to be innocent. Id Researchers found that mock jurors were more likely to render a guilty
verdict if an eyewitness positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator than if he could not
identify the defendant as the perpetrator. Id at 646, 649. Further, the study also found that
eyewitness identifications increased the number of guilty verdicts, even when the eyewitness
identification was shown to be incorrect. Id at 649. Researchers found that the participants were
just as likely to render a guilty verdict when the eyewitness chose the wrong person out of the
line-up than when the eyewitness chose the defendant out of the line-up. Id.; see also Jennifer N.
Sigler & James V. Couch, Eyewitness Testimony and the Jury Verdict, 4 N. AM. J. OF PSYCHOL.
143, 146 (2002) (finding that in a mock trial experiment, mock juries convicted forty-nine percent
of the time, but when an eyewitness testified, the conviction rate rose to sixty-eight percent).
49. Loftus, supra note 40, at 189; Pozzulo et al., supra note 48, at 649. But see Sigler &
Couch, supra note 48, at 146 (finding that the rate of conviction decreased significantly when the
eyewitness was discredited).
50. LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 84; see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S.
341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the "powerful impact" eyewitness
identification has on witnesses "despite its inherent unreliability"); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 119-20 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the "untrustworthiness of
eyewitness identification" and "the fact that juries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to
such evidence").
51. See LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 123-24; Loftus, supra note 40, at 189;
Pozzulo et al., supra note 48, at 649.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985) (ruling that the
trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony of an expert in perception and memory on the
inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications).
53. See supra note 10.
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Court interpreted Rule 702 for the first time. 54 The Court set out a two-part
test for complying with Rule 702: first, the expert testimony had to be
"scientific knowledge," and second, the testimony had to "assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue."55 The Court added that even if
expert testimony survived both prongs of the Daubert test, a judge could still
exclude the evidence if it violated another Rule of Evidence, such as Rule
403.56 Rule 403 states that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."57
Prosecutors often argue that the type of information that eyewitness experts
provide is not scientific, so it fails to meet the first prong of Rule 702 as set out
by Daubert.58  Further, prosecutors argue that even if the information is
scientific, the information is common sense to the lay juror; therefore, such
testimony does not assist the trier of fact and fails to meet the second prong of
Rule 702 as set out in Daubert.59 Prosecutors also frequently invoke Rule 403
in objecting to expert testimony about eyewitness identifications, arguing that
the unfair prejudice and confusion that eyewitness-expert testimony has on the
jury substantially outweighs any small benefit that it serves.60
Prosecutors argue that an eyewitness expert's testimony that questions the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications confuses jurors as to their role in
determining eyewitness credibility and as to whether they should accept the
54. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1993). Prior to
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the District of Columbia Circuit held in Frye v.
United States that in order for expert testimony to be admissible, it had to be "generally accepted"
within the scientific community. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923),
superseded by rule, FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. In Daubert,
two minors and their parents sued the manufacturer of a drug that the mothers had taken while
pregnant, alleging that it was the cause of birth defects in the minors. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
Both sides introduced experts to testify regarding the harmfulness or lack of harmfulness of the
drug. Id. at 582-83. The trial court granted the pharmaceutical company's motion for summary
judgment, and the Ninth Circuit, applying the "general acceptance" standard from Frye, affirmed,
holding that the methods of the expert witnesses presented by the minors and their parents were
not "generally accepted" in the scientific community. Id. at 583-84; see also Frye, 293 F. at
1014. The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, holding that the "general acceptance"
standard was "superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence," and that Rule 702
did not require a "general acceptance" standard. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88.
55. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
56. Id at 595.
57. FED. R. EVID. 403.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883-84 (8th Cir. 1996).
59. See, e.g., id. at 884-85.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1999); United States
v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051-52
(7th Cir. 1992).
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expert's determination that eyewitness identification is inaccurate to mean that
they must altogether discount the eyewitness identification in their case.6 On
the other hand, supporters of eyewitness-expert testimony argue that allowing
eyewitness experts provides the jury with all of the information necessary to
make an informed decision and, thus, increases the likelihood of a just result.6 2
C. Researchers Argue a Need for Eyewitness Experts in the Courtroom
Courts generally have held that eyewitness experts are unnecessary because
the information they provide is common sense and therefore, not helpful to the
63
jury. Academic research, however, suggests that both judges and jurors lack
sufficient understanding of factors affecting memory and perception of
eyewitness accounts. 64 For example, the United States Supreme Court in Neil
v. Biggers upheld a rape conviction even though the victim identified the
defendant seven months after the attack and only after highly suggestive police
65
conduct during the identification. The Court supported its decision, in part,
by emphasizing the confidence with which the victim identified the defendant
61. See Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 288-89 (precluding an expert's testimony on the basis that it
might confuse or mislead the jury); Kime, 99 F.3d at 884-85 (recognizing the danger that expert
testimony could either confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert's opinion for its own);
Curry, 977 F.2d at 1051-52 (affirming the district court's opinion finding eyewitness-expert
testimony unhelpful because the jury was generally aware of the problems with eyewitness
testimony).
62. See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that
eyewitness-expert testimony could be helpful in prompting the jury to view the eyewitness
testimony in a different light); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that expert testimony
aids jurors in fully comprehending the complex issues they must decide)); United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that expert testimony can assist the jury in
making the correct decision).
63. See Kime, 99 F.3d at 884 (stating that the jury was capable of determining eyewitness
credibility without the aid of an eyewitness expert); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1051 (affirming the trial
court's determination that eyewitness experts were not needed because the jury was "generally
aware" of problems with eyewitness identification); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641
(5th Cir. 1982) ("Moreover, we conclude ... that the jury can adequately weigh these problems
through common-sense evaluation.").
64. See Brian L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical
Analysis, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 215, 222-23 (1989) (finding that mock jurors were not "sensitive"
to the factors affecting eyewitness identification, and mock jurors were, overall,
"unknowledgeable" about what to look for during eyewitness-identification testimony); Richard
S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability
Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 204 (2006) (finding that potential jurors were ignorant of the
factors that affect an eyewitness's perception).
65. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1972). The police were unable to locate
anyone in the county jail resembling the defendant to put in the police line-up. Id. at 195.
Therefore, police officers walked the defendant, by himself, past the victim, who identified him
as her attacker. Id.
5412011]
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as the assailant.66 Similarly, a study conducted by the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia, in conjunction with Dr. Elizabeth Loftus and a
private research firm, found that mock jurors believed that confidence and
accuracy are directly correlated; in other words, mock jurors believed that a
confident identification is an accurate identification.67  Research, however,
shows that confidence in identification and accuracy of identification are, at
best, weakly correlated.6 An eyewitness's strong confidence in her
identification does not make her any more likely to be accurate in her
identification. 6 9
Additionally, the study by the Public Defenders Service for the District of
Columbia found that jurors thought that the presence of a weapon during a
crime made the eyewitness more reliable or had no effect;70 that stress made
66. See id at 200-01 (stating that the victim gave a detailed description of her attacker and
had "no doubt" that the defendant was her assailant).
67. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 193-94, 199. Thirty-one percent of participants
believed that persons who were "absolutely certain" in their identifications were "much more
reliable" than persons with less confidence. Id. at 199. Only seventeen percent correctly believed
that confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identifications are weakly correlated. Id. Forty
percent of respondents believed that confidence was an "excellent indicator" of accuracy in
eyewitness identification. Id.; see Cutler et al., supra note 64, at 222 (finding that jurors were
unaware that confidence was a poor predictor of accuracy in eyewitness identifications); Brian L.
Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
185, 189-90 (1990) (finding that participants heavily relied on the eyewitness's confidence in her
identification when determining the accuracy of the identification) see also Watkins v. Sowders,
449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY 19 (1979) (stating that jurors place a great deal of weight on eyewitness confidence
regardless of the fact that confidence is not a good indicator of accuracy).
68. See Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: The Role of
System and Estimator Variables, II LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 246 (1987) (finding that, in a
study relating eyewitness factors and eyewitness performance, the confidence-accuracy
correlation was weak); Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 199 (discussing that confidence is a
function of personality and does not predict identification reliability). Some people are simpy
more confident in their ability to identify an assailant, which does not necessarily make them
more accurate in their identification. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 199; see also Brian L.
Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Forensically Relevant Moderators of the Relation Between
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Confidence, 74 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 650, 651-52
(1989) (determining through a meta-analysis that the correlation between pre-line-up confidence
and accuracy in identifications is weaker than the correlation between post-line-up confidence
and accuracy).
69. See Cutler et al., supra note 68, at 246.
70. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 196-97. Thirty-seven percent of survey participants
thought that the presence of a gun strengthened the eyewitness's ability to identify the assailant,
while an additional thirty-three percent were either unsure of the effect of a weapon or thought
that the presence of a gun would have no effect on eyewitness identification. Id. at 197. Only
thirty percent of participants correctly believed that weapon presence actually decreases one's
attention to detail, thus lowering one's eyewitness-identification reliability. Id.; see also Cutler et
al., supra note 67, at 188, 190 (finding that jurors were "insensitive" to the fact that weapon
presence negatively impacts eyewitness identification).
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the eyewitness more reliable or had no effect; 71 and that cross-racial
identifications were at least as reliable, if not more reliable, than same-race
identifications.72 Further, the study found that participants agreed with
statements such as, "I never forget a face," which implies that jurors believe
that memory remains constant over time, regardless of post-event occurrences
and the passage of time.73
Numerous other studies, however, prove that all of these assumptions are
wrong.74  The presence of a weapon actually makes an eyewitness
identification less reliable;75 high stress levels can decrease the reliability of an
identification; 76 cross-race identifications are far less reliable than same-race
identifications,77 particularly when a white witness is attempting to identify a
non-white perpetrator;78  and memory often deteriorates or changes
71. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 197. Thirty-nine percent of participants believed that
increased stress levels caused by witnessing a crime of violence were likely to produce more
reliable eyewitness identifications, while thirty-three percent felt that it would have no effect or
were unsure of the effect. Id. Only thirty percent of participants correctly believed that the
presence of stress caused by a violent crime reduced one's reliability in identifying the
perpetrator. Id.
72. Id. at 200. Forty-eight percent of participants believed that cross-racial identifications
were equally as reliable as same-race identifications, while an additional eleven percent believed
that cross-racial identifications were actually more reliable or were unsure of the effect of
cross-racial identifications. Id Only thirty-six percent of participants correctly believed that
cross-racial identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications. Id.
73. Id. at 195-96; see LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 65 (stating that memory
fades with time, and therefore the longer the time in between the eyewitness event and identifying
the assailant, the poorer the memory).
74. See, e.g., LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 58-59 (explaining that the
passage of time and post-event experiences negatively affect memory); Brian R. Clifford & Clive
R. Hollin, Effects ofthe Type ofIncident and the Number ofPerpetrators on Eyewitness Memory,
60 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 364, 368 (1981); Cutler et al., supra note 68, at 244 (stating that
identification accuracy is negatively affected by the visibility of a weapon); Carol Krafka &
Steven Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field Experiment on Eyewitness Identification, 49
J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58, 58 (1985) (stating that there is no relation between
confidence and accuracy); Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 196 (finding that the presence of a
weapon and stress both negatively affect identification accuracy); Peter N. Shapiro & Steven
Penrod, Meta-Analysis ofFacial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOLO. BULL. 139, 149 (1986)
(highlighting a negative cross-race identification effect on accuracy).
75. Cutler et al., supra note 68, at 244. The presence of a weapon usually causes witnesses
to focus on the weapon rather than the assailant, resulting in poorer ability to identify the
assailant. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 196.
76. Clifford & Hollin, supra note 74, at 368 (finding that the presence of stress narrows the
eyewitness's focus, making her less likely to remember more than a few details).
77. Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 74, at 149. The University of Michigan study on
exonerations found that, although only ten percent of all rapes are cross-racial (that is, an African
American male raping a Caucasian woman), fifty percent of those exonerated for rape were
convicted of raping someone of a different race. Gross et al., supra note 4, at 547-48. In other
words, there was a much higher rate of misidentifications leading to wrongful convictions in
cross-racial identifications than in same-race identifications. Id
78. Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 74, at 149.
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dramatically with the passage of time or with the introduction of new
information.79 As the court in United States v. Moore noted, jurors are often
either ignorant of the effects of certain circumstances on eyewitness
identification or unable to assess these effects correctly because many are
counterintuitive to their beliefs.80
Courts have held that any misconception concerning the various factors
influencing eyewitness testimony can be dispelled by cross-examination or
jury instructions.82 Researchers, however, argue that neither cross-examination
nor jury instructions are adequate to combat unreliable or inaccurate
eyewitness testimony. Both case law and anecdotal evidence suggest that
defense attorneys are generally not present when an eyewitness identifies the
defendant from photographs, and defense attorneys are only sometimes present
when the eyewitness identifies the defendant from a line-up. 84  Therefore,
defense attorneys may be unaware that the police elicited an identification
tainted by suggestive behavior, whether through unscrupulous methods or
79. See LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 58-59 (stating that the introduction of
new evidence between witnessing the event and recalling the event may distort one's memory).
80. United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986); see also United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Each of these 'variables' goes beyond what
an average juror might know as a matter of common knowledge, and indeed some of them
directly contradict 'common sense."').
81. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that any
inaccuracies in eyewitness testimony could be overcome through cross-examination); United
States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "vigorous cross-examination" of
the witness could counter any weaknesses in eyewitness identification); United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e conclude . . . that the problems of perception and
memory can be adequately addressed in cross-examination . . . ."); United States v. Fosher, 590
F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming the trial court's determination that cross-examination
was adequate to combat a potentially unreliable eyewitness identification); United States v.
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Certainly effective cross-examination is adequate
to reveal any inconsistencies or deficiencies in the eye-witness testimony.").
82. See United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that proper jury
instructions help combat the dangers of eyewitness testimony); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d
921, 925 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a "comprehensive instruction on eyewitness
identifications" sufficiently addressed the various factors influencing the reliability and accuracy
of such testimony); Fosher, 590 F.2d at 382 (affirming the trial court's holding that proper jury
instruction, in part, mitigated possible weaknesses in eyewitness testimony).
83. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 155-57, 263-64 (1995).
84. See id. at 155-56 (discussing the case law governing when a defendant has the right to
have counsel present during identifications); see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 300-02,
317, 321 (1973) (holding that a defendant does not have a right to have defense counsel present
during an identification by an eyewitness using a photo array, even if that photo array occurs
post-indictment, as long as the defendant is not physically present during the photo array); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (holding that a suspect does not have a right to counsel
during a line-up that occurs post-arrest but pre-indictment). But see United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (holding that a defendant has a right to have an attorney present during a
post-indictment line-up).
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inadvertent actions. The defense is thus at a distinct disadvantage to uncover
this behavior during cross-examination.86 Furthermore, defense counsel often
must rely heavily upon police records and potentially biased police accounts of
the witness's demeanor when identifying the defendant to determine the
conditions under which the identification occurred. Even more daunting for
the defense, multiple studies have found that once a defense attorney
successfully discredits an eyewitness during cross-examination, jurors still find
that eyewitness testimony unduly persuasive.88  Researchers also argue that
jury instructions are more likely to confuse jurors by presenting a limited
number of factors affecting eyewitness accounts without explaining their
effects and by including irrelevant factors or excluding relevant factors.
Researchers argue that eyewitness experts can educate juries on the potential
weaknesses of eyewitness testimony and can prevent misidentifications in a
way that jury instructions and cross-examination cannot.90 Research has
shown that mock jurors exposed to eyewitness-expert testimony were better
informed about the effects of various factors on eyewitness identification and
used this knowledge when rendering verdicts.91 In one study, mock jurors who
heard an eyewitness expert testify spent significantly more time discussing the
eyewitness identification testimony in deliberation than mock jurors who were
not exposed to the expert. 92 Additionally, those mock jurors who heard expert
testimony discussed the entire body of evidence for a significantly longer
85. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 228-29; CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 156. In Wade, the
eyewitnesses glimpsed the defendant standing with FBI agents in the hallway prior to the line-up.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 233-34. The Court recognized that the defendant being accompanied by law
enforcement prior to the line-up may have tainted the eyewitness identification because it
suggested that the defendant was the perpetrator. Id Thus, there are numerous ways in which a
police officer may introduce an improper suggestion while conducting a line-up.
86. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 155-56.
87. Id
88. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
89. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 256-57, 263.
90. See id. at 250, 264.
91. Harmon M. Hosch et al., Influence ofExpert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy
on Jury Decisions, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 294 (1980); see also Cutler et al., supra note 64,
at 222-23 (finding that while jurors still found eyewitness testimony persuasive, after hearing
eyewitness-expert testimony regarding the weak correlation between confidence and accurate
identifications, jurors did not weigh confidence as heavily when determining the credibility of the
eyewitness); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 311, 322-23 (1989) (finding that jurors who heard eyewitness-expert
testimony were better informed as to the effects of weapon presence than those who did not hear
the expert testimony, and jurors who heard expert testimony rated confidence of the eyewitness as
less relevant than those who did not hear the expert witness).
92. See Hosch et al., supra note 91, at 293. The group that heard testimony from the
eyewitness expert spent 27.9% of its total deliberation time discussing the eyewitness testimony,
while the group that did not hear the expert testimony spent only 9.58% of its total deliberation
time discussing the eyewitness testimony. Id
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period than those mock jurors who did not.93  Based on these findings, the
researchers argued that eyewitness-expert testimony not only informed mock
jurors of the weaknesses in eyewitness testimony and prompted more critical
evaluation of eyewitness testimony, but that eyewitness-ex ert testimony also
caused mock jurors to examine all evidence more critically.
D. Courts' Positions on the Admissibility ofEyewitness Experts
1. Courts Have Excluded Expert-Eyewitness Testimony for Failure to Pass
the Daubert Test
Although many courts, even those that ultimately exclude eyewitness-expert
testimony, recognize the scientific legitimacy of such evidence, other courts
refuse to do so and have held that e ewitness-expert testimony fails to satisfy
the first prong of the Daubert test. Other courts have excluded eyewitness-
expert testimony under the second prong of the Daubert test, stating that the
jury is well aware of the information within the expert's testimony and that the
evidence does not assist the trier of fact in its determination. 96 Thus, courts
have used both prongs of the Daubert test to justify barring eyewitness-expert
testimony.
93. Id.
94. Id at 294.
95. Compare United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the
eyewitness expert qualified as an expert and would have provided scientific knowledge, but
excluded the testimony for other reasons), United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1358 (1Ith Cir.
1997) (noting that the lower court held that expert eyewitness testimony is scientific knowledge
and the parties did not raise that issue on appeal), United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042,
1051-52, 1052 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the eyewitness-expert testimony was not excluded
because there was doubt concerning its scientific legitimacy), and United States v. Moore, 786
F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that it was proper to consider eyewitness-expert
testimony as scientific knowledge), with United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defense counsel had not proven that the evidence to be offered by the eyewitness
expert was scientific knowledge), and United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923-26 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that, in this particular case, defense counsel failed to establish that
eyewitness-expert testimony was "scientific knowledge," but noting that such testimony is not per
se unscientific).
96. See Kime, 99 F.3d at 884 (holding that the jury was perfectly capable of properly
weighing the evidence without the testimony of the eyewitness expert, and that the testimony thus
would not have aided the trier of fact); Rincon, 28 F.3d at 925 (holding that the district court did
not err in finding that eyewitness-expert testimony would not assist the trier of fact in the
decision-making process); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-35 (4th Cir. 1993)
(affirming the lower court's exclusion of eyewitness-expert testimony because it failed to assist
the trier of fact); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding that the lower
court had not abused its discretion by excluding eyewitness-expert testimony as within the
knowledge of lay jurors and therefore expert testimony did not assist the jurors).
[Vol. 60:533546
United States v. Smith: Approaching Eyewitness Experts
2. Courts Have Excluded Eyewitness-Expert Testimony for Violating Rule
403
Courts have also held that eyewitness-expert testimony substitutes the jury's
determination of eyewitness credibility with that of the expert's opinion,
thereby violating Rule 403 by undermining the prosecution's eyewitnesses and
confusing the jury's role.97
In United States v. Fosher, the defendant was convicted of bank robbery and
assault almost solely on the identification of two eyewitnesses. 98 At trial, the
defendant sought to have an eyewitness expert testify as to the unreliability of
such identifications.99 The trial court excluded this testimony.100 In affirming
the trial court's ruling, the First Circuit stated that the testimony of an expert
has the "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness."' Such testimony
would unduly prejudice the eyewitness because the jury would substitute its
own credibility determination with that of the expert' s. 02
In United States v. Lumpkin, the eyewitness expert for the defense testified
that confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identifications are, at best, weakly
correlated.103 The Second Circuit held that the testimony of the expert witness
was rightfully excluded because it was the jury's job to consider all of the
factors, including demeanor and confidence, when determining witness
credibility.' 04 By discounting the eyewitness's confidence, the expert was, to
an extent, expressing his opinion on the eyewitness's credibility. 0 5 The expert
testimony would confuse and influence the jury in its assessment of the
eyewitness's credibility.106
97. See Kime, 99 F.3d at 884 ("This line of testimony intrudes into the jury's domain.").
The Second Circuit in United States v. Lumpkin stated that eyewitness experts assess witness
credibility and invade the jury's role. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 289.
98. Fosher, 590 F.2d at 382. The state's case was built almost exclusively on two
eyewitnesses who testified that they had seen the defendant near the crime scene around the time
of the crime. Id.
99. Id
100. Id. The trial court held that the eyewitness-expert testimony would not assist the jury in
judging the issues, any danger of misidentification could be addressed through other means, such
as cross-examination and jury instructions, and the level of prejudice that such testimony created
was extremely high and substantially outweighed any probative value. Id
101. Id. at 383.
102. Id
103. United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 1999). Convicted of drug charges
based primarily on the identifications of two undercover police officers, the defendant argued that
the officer identifications were inaccurate because there were discrepancies in the report, and
police officer identifications are no more reliable than average citizen identifications, and he
offered eyewitness-expert testimony regarding the weak correlation between confidence and
reliable identifications to support these arguments. Id.
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The Second Circuit determined that the confusion created by eyewitness
experts was great enough to substantially outweigh any probative value of such
testimony."o Like the First 08 and Secondl09 Circuits, the Fifth,no Seventh,"
Eighth,1 2 and Ninth" 3  Circuits have also excluded eyewitness-expert
107. Id.
108. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979).
109. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 289.
110. United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir. 1986). Moore is a bit of an
anomaly in that it upholds the lower court's exclusion of eyewitness-expert testimony while
speaking very favorably and extensively about the probative value of eyewitness-expert
testimony. Id at 1312-13. In Moore, armed men entered the home of a bank president and
strapped fake bombs to the president, his wife, and his daughter. Id at 1310. The men then
threatened to detonate the bombs strapped to his wife and daughter if the bank president did not
take the men to the bank and give them money. Id The president took the men to the bank and
gave them $48,000. Id After later being arrested, one of the co-defendants confessed,
implicating the other defendants. Id. at 1310-11. In addition to this confession, the United States
produced two eyewitnesses: one testified that he had seen the defendants casing the president's
home shortly before the extortion, and the other testified that she had seen one of the defendants
driving a delivery truck leaving the president's residence moments after the extortion took place.
Id. at 1311. The trial judge refused to allow the defense's eyewitness expert to testify regarding
factors that may affect eyewitness identifications. Id. The judge stated that such testimony was
unnecessary and was within his discretion to exclude. Id The defendants were convicted and
appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 1310.
The Fifth Circuit discussed at length the trend toward admitting eyewitness experts and the
probative value of such testimony to counter lay jurors' ignorance on the subject. Id. at 1312.
However, the court went on to affirm the lower court's exclusion of such testimony, holding that
the trial court had not abused its discretion. Id at 1312-13. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that
there was strong evidence against the defendants in addition to the eyewitness identifications. Id
at 1313. The court suggested that if the United States' sole evidence was the eyewitness
identifications, then the outcome may have been different. Id.
Ill. United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992). In Curry, the
defendants were convicted of "conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute in
excess of fifty kilograms of marijuana." Id at 1046. At trial, the United States introduced
testimony from eyewitnesses who identified the defendants as persons who were seen at the farm
where the marijuana was discovered. Id. at 1050-51. To combat this testimony, the defense
introduced an eyewitness expert. Id. The trial court excluded this testimony because it would
introduce information of which the jury was "generally aware," which impliedly meant that the
testimony would not be helpful, would be confusing and misleading, or both. Id at 1051. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling, stating that the trial judge had discretion to exclude this
evidence under either Rule 702 or Rule 403. Id. at 1052.
112. United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996). The defendants were
convicted of multiple drug charges for their involvement in a drug distribution ring. Id. at
876-77. At trial, a witness identified the defendants as the men who robbed him of drugs. Id at
882. The district court denied the defendants' attempt to introduce an eyewitness expert. Id. at
883. The district court held that the eyewitness expert did not pass either prong of the Daubert
test (the testimony did not consist of scientific knowledge and did not assist the trier of fact), nor
did it meet the requirements of Rule 403. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the probative value of
such testimony was minimal because it was common sense and the jury was likely to be confused
and substitute its own credibility determination with the expert's determination. Id. at 884.
113. United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1994). In Rincon, the defendant
was convicted of unarmed bank robbery and sought to introduce an eyewitness expert to counter
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testimony for causing confusion or undue prejudice in the jury's assessment of
eyewitness credibility in violation of Rule 403.
3. Courts Have Refused to Adopt a Blanket Exclusion ofAll Eyewitness
Experts
Although these courts have held that eyewitness-expert testimony should be
excluded in the particular cases before them,l14 the overall trend in the country
over the past twenty years has been a more accepting attitude toward
eyewitness-expert testimony.' 15  Even the courts that have excluded
eyewitness-expert testimony have stated that the determination of the
admissibility of eyewitness-expert testimony lies within the discretion of the
trial judge.l 16 Further, most courts state that their exclusion of such testimony
is not a blanket exclusion of all eyewitness-expert testimony." 7 Some of these
courts also recognize situations where they would admit, or at least be more
eyewitness identifications. Id. at 922. The trial court excluded the evidence, holding that the
evidence failed to meet either prong of the Daubert test and was likely to cause jury confusion.
Id. at 923. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding, and although it never explicitly
cited Rule 403, the opinion advanced Rule 403 principles, stating that any helpfulness of the
testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of the testimony confusing or misleading
the jury. Id. at 926.
114. See supra notes 108-13.
115. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting a modern trend to
allow eyewitness-expert testimony); Moore, 786 F.2d at 1312 (stating that recent court opinions
have been more willing to uphold lower court decisions admiting eyewitness-expert testimony
and to scrutinize lower court decisions excluding such testimony). Compare United States v.
Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that eyewitness-expert testimony was not
admissible in the Eleventh Circuit), with United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355. 1359 (1lth Cir.
1997) (refusing to state a blanket rule that eyewitness-expert testimony was never admissible).
116. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A decision to exclude
expert testimony rests soundly with the discretion of the trial court . . . "); Harris, 995 F.2d at
534 ("Most courts allowing such expert testimony, however, recognize that the ultimate
determination of admissibility . . . rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."); United
States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Although it is likely that it was within the
discretion of the trial court to allow the eyewitness-expert testimony here, we decline to hold that
the court was required to do so."); Moore, 786 F.2d at 1312 ("We therefore recognize that the
admission of this type of testimony is proper, at least in some cases."). In fact, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. seems to imply that such a blanket exclusion of all
eyewitness-expert testimony violates Rule 702. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 592-93 (1993). By setting out factors to be weighed, the Court implies that these factors
should be weighed in every case and expert testimony should not be excluded without applying
the factors. Id. at 589-93; see also United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 335-36 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding that Rule 702 prescribes the criteria expert witnesses must meet in order to be allowed to
testify under the Daubert test); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by excluding an eyewitness expert from
testifying without first applying the Daubert test).
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likely to admit, eyewitness-expert testimony, such as a situation where no other
corroborating evidence was present." 8
4. Courts Have Admitted Eyewitness-Expert Testimony, Holding that It
Passes the Daubert Test and Does Not Violate Rule 403
Although the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have excluded eyewitness-expert testimon because it did not meet the
requirements set out in Rule 702 or Rule 403,1 9 the Third 20 and Sixth1 21
Circuits have both accepted eyewitness-expert testimony.
The Third and Sixth Circuits have held that eyewitness-expert testimony can
be scientific and can assist the trier of fact, thus passing the Daubert test.122
Additionally, these courts have recognized that the probative value of
eyewitness experts can outweigh any prejudice or confusion they might
123cause.
118. See Moore, 786 F.2d at 1313 ("We emphasize that in a case in which the sole testimony
is casual eyewitness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification
is admissible and properly may be encouraged."); see also United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870,
885 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We are 'especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion [in denying expert
eyewitness identification testimony] unless the government's case against the defendant rested
exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony."' (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987))); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (finding that the
majority of the state's case rested on other corroborating evidence and suggesting that had there
not been corroborating evidence, the court's decision may have been different); United States v.
Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (refusing to disturb the district
court's holding because there was such strong evidence corroborating the eyewitnesses'
testimony).
119. See supra notes 108-13.
120. See Mathis, 264 F.3d at 339-40, 42 (holding that the probative value of the eyewitness
expert in this case was far greater than any abstract danger of prejudice or confusion that such
testimony might cause the jury); see also United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir.
1999) (admitting expert eyewitness testimony under Rule 702, although not explicitly addressing
Rule 403); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230-32 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing the
strong probative value eyewitness experts have by informing the jury of relevant factors affecting
eyewitness identification, but leaving the Rule 403 issue to be addressed by the district court on
remand).
121. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that
eyewitness-expert testimony is generally admissible in the Sixth Circuit and remanding the case
to the district court because the it had erred in excluding eyewitness-expert testimony without
performing the Daubert analysis). But see United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (6th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's exclusion because, although the
eyewitness-expert testimony may have been admissible and had probative value, exclusion did
not prejudice the defendant).
122. See Smithers, 212 F.3d at 315 (holding that the lower court did not properly apply the
Daubert test, and if it had it likely would have found that the eyewitness-expert testimony
satisfied both prongs of the Daubert test).
123. Mathis, 264 F.3d at 339-40 (discussing the value that eyewitness-expert testimony has
in educating and assisting the jury while also stating that it does not believe that the prosecution's
argument that eyewitness experts create prejudice and confusion has any merit); Smith, 736 F.2d
at 1107 (discussing the probative value of eyewitness-expert testimony).
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The Third Circuit in United States v. Mathis found that the testimony offered
by an expert eyewitness was not only scientific, but also greatly aided the jury,
thus meeting both prongs of the Daubert test.124 The court then discussed the
great probative value that eyewitness experts provide juries and held that the
lower court abused its discretion by excluding the expert eyewitness's
testimony on the relationship between confidence and accuracy and the effects
of the presence of a weapon on identifications.125 The Third Circuit stated that
the effect of such factors on eyewitness identifications would not be known by
a typical juror and, therefore, should not have been excluded.126 Further, the
court seemed baffled by the argument that eyewitness experts usurp the role of
the jury. 127 The court questioned how eyewitness experts were different from
any other type of expert witness and questioned why opponents believed that
the "aura of reliability" that the jury places on eyewitness experts would be any
different from the "aura of reliability" that the jury would place on, for
example, an expert who testifies on his interpretation of satellite pictures.128
The court went on to say that "experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to
juridically pertinent aspects of the human mind and body should generally,
absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be welcomed by federal courts, not
turned away." 29
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Smith held that the district
court excluded an eyewitness expert from testifying at trial regarding the
unreliability of eyewitness identification who could have helped the jury
understand the case.130 The court noted the danger of misidentification leading
124. Mathis, 264 F.3d at 338-40.
125. Id. at 340-42. On October 14, 1998, an officer who had just received a call reporting a
bank robbery spotted a car that matched the description of the getaway car. Id at 325. The
officer gave chase, and upon the car stalling, three men jumped out of the car and fled. Id. The
officer testified that the man who jumped out of the rear of the car turned and looked at him for a
moment. Id The officer then identified the defendant as that man. Id. This is the eyewitness
account that the defendant intended to counter with the eyewitness-expert testimony. Id. at 333.
126. Id at 342.
127. See id. at 340.
128. Id at 339-40.
129. Id at 340.
130. United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). During a
bank robbery, three tellers had the opportunity to view the robbers for several minutes. Id. at
1104. Immediately after the robbery, the tellers were unable to pick out the defendant in a photo
spread as one of the robbers; however, four months later, they picked the defendant out of a
line-up. Id. at 1105. At trial, the tellers testified that the defendant was one of the bank robbers.
Id. The defendant sought to rebut this testimony with testimony by an eyewitness expert, which
the trial court excluded on Rule 403 grounds. Id Although the Sixth Circuit found that the
eyewitness-expert testimony was improperly excluded, the court held that admittance of the
eyewitness-expert testimony would not have affected the outcome due to the fact that officers had
also recovered the defendant's palmprint from the scene of the crime. Id. at 1107-08.
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to wrongful convictions and stated that eyewitness experts helped to better
inform the jury of all aspects of the case.' 31
A circuit split exists regarding the admissibility of expert eyewitness
testimony.132  The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits
have excluded eyewitness-expert testimony due to the unfair prejudice and
confusion it allegedly causes jurors, 133 and the Third and Sixth Circuits have
admitted eyewitness-expert testimony due to its alleged helpfulness to jurors
allowing them to evaluate the facts of the case accompanied by the knowledge
of the unreliability of witness identification and the effect that various factors
have on perception.' 34
E. The Admissibility ofEyewitness-Expert Testimony in the Eleventh Circuit
In general, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that the admission of expert
testimony is within the discretion of the trial judge. 35 The more specific issue
of eyewitness-expert testimony has come before the Eleventh Circuit on
several occasions.136  In cases prior to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit ruled that eyewitness-expert
testimony was never admissible and that any negative effect of eyewitness
testimony could be offset by cross-examination and jury instructions. 137
131. Id at 1106. The prosecution conceded that the eyewitness expert was in fact an expert.
Id. at 1105. The court first held that the information about which the expert sought to testify was
information that was beyond the knowledge of the lay juror, and thus would aid the trier of fact.
Id at 1106-07. Finally, the court found that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial.
Id at 1107; see also Mathis, 264 F.3d at 340 (stating that eyewitness-expert testimony helped
jurors to see the facts of the case in a different light, thus allowing them to make a better informed
decision).
132. Compare Mathis, 264 F.3d at 340 (holding that eyewitness-expert testimony assists the
jury by providing all of the necessary information for the jury to make a fair determination and
should therefore be admitted), with United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that eyewitness experts interfere with the jury's role and should therefore be excluded).
133. See supra notes 108-13.
134. See supra notes 120-21.
135. See United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1283 (1lth Cir. 2002) (holding that the
judge's decision regarding whether to admit expert testimony should only be reversed if found to
be "manifestly erroneous").
136. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357-59 (1lth Cir. 1997); United States v.
Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (1lth Cir. 1992); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315
(llth Cir. 1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641-42 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
Decisions by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, an administrative division created during the split
of the Fifth Circuit, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc.,
667 F.2d 33, 34 (11 th Cir. 1982).
137. See Holloway, 971 F.2d at 679 (holding that the defendant's argument that the district
court erred in refusing to allow his eyewitness expert to testify at trial had no merit because "[t]he
established rule ofthis circuit is that such testimony is not admissible"); Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1315
(holding that the district court did not err in its refusal to admit eyewitness-expert testimony
because "such testimony is not admissible in this circuit"); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 641-42 (holding
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In United States v. Smith, the Eleventh Circuit once again examined the
issue, but this time in light of the standards set out in Daubert.'38 The court
held that its prior decisions were consistent with Daubert and that it was within
the district court's discretion to exclude expert testimony.139 However, the
court did not go as far as it had previously because it did not state that
eyewitness-expert testimony was never admissible.140 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit seemed somewhat more accepting of eyewitness-expert testimony than
it had been previously.
II. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
ALABAMA ADDRESSES THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS-EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN UNITED STATES V. SMTH
In United States v. Smith, a case before the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama, Andreas Jejuan Smith, an African American
male, was charged with armed robbery of a bank.141  The only two
eyewitnesses to the crime were two bank employees. 142 Two weeks after the
robbery, one of the eyewitnesses, Annette Gurley, a Caucasian female,
identified Smith as the robber from a photographic line-up. 143
At trial, the government offered the two eyewitnesses who discussed the
details of the robbery, including the high degree of stress they felt during the
event. 144 Both eyewitnesses identified Smith as the bank robber.145 Gurley
stated that she was certain the defendant was the robber, while the other
eyewitness testified that he was seventy to eighty ercent sure that the
defendant had similar features to the bank robber. 6 The eyewitnesses
admitted that they had in fact discussed the case and the description of the
robber with each other prior to trial.147
that the district court was correct in excluding the eyewitness-expert testimony, and stating that
cross-examination "adequately addressed" any problems with eyewitness identification).
138. Smith, 122 F.3d at 1357-58.
139. Id. at 1359.
140. See id. at 1357-59.
141. United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209 (M.D. Ala. 2009). Smith was also
charged with assault of a federal officer for shooting at officers when they arrived to arrest Smith,
with carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, and with being a felon in possession of a
firearm. Id
142. Supplemental Brief in Response to the Government's Motion In Limine to Exclude
Expert Testimony at 9-10, United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (No.
2:07crl65-MHT) [hereinafter Supplemental BriefJ.
143. Id at 10.
144. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1214-16. One of the eyewitnesses stated that the event was
the "most traumatic experience of her life." Id at 1216.
145. Id. at 1209, 1214-15.
146. Id. at 1218; Supplemental Brief, supra note 142, at 9-10 & 9 n.12.
147. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
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Smith then called Dr. Sol Fulero, an eyewitness expert, to testify regarding
the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony and, more specifically, the inaccuracy
of cross-racial eyewitness identification.148 The government filed a motion to
exclude Dr. Fulero's testimony, arguing first that it violated Rule 702 by not
meeting the factors of the Daubert test and, second, that it violated Rule 403
because the prejudice created by such testimony substantially outweighed its
probative value. 149 The defense responded to the motion to exclude and argued
that there were many factors in the case that could potentially affect the
eyewitness identifications and, therefore, the jury should hear the expert
testimony. 50  Additionally, there was no evidence to corroborate the
eyewitness testimony, so the defense argued that because the jury would have
to decide Smith's guilt based almost exclusively on the eyewitness
identifications, the jury should have all available information relating to
eyewitness identifications.
The court denied the government's motion in part and sustained it in part. 152
Although it allowed Dr. Fulero to testify regarding the scientific knowledge of
eyewitness identifications in general, the court barred him from giving his
opinion regarding the witnesses in the particular case before the jury. 5 3 The
jury convicted Smith.' 54
After the conviction, the court provided a detailed opinion explaining its
decision to allow Dr. Fulero to testify about eyewitness identifications in
general.155  The court first addressed whether Dr. Fulero could pro erly be
admitted as an expert witness under Rule 702 and the Daubert test. The
court, considering the first prong of the Daubert test, concluded that Dr.
Fulero's testimony was scientific knowledge.157 The court then determined
148. Id at 1208-09.
149. Id. at 1209, 1211.
150. Supplemental Brief, supra note 142, at 9-11. Specifically, the defense argued that there
was a gun present, one of the eyewitnesses was white while the robber was black, the eyewitness
did not accurately identify the defendant as the bank robber until at least two weeks after the
robbery, and the eyewitness stated that she was confident in her selection. Id. at 10.
151. Id at 10, 12-13.
152. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
153. Id.
154. Id. Smith was also convicted of illegally possessing a firearm. He was acquitted on the
charges of assaulting a federal officer and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Id
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1211-19.
157. Id. at 1212-13 (noting that a number of other courts had admitted Dr. Fulero's
testimony on similar occasions, that the theories of Dr. Fulero's testimony were "well-tested in
peer-reviewed publications," and that Dr. Fulero relied on methods that are generally accepted
within the behavioral science community). In United States v. Smithers, the court found that, had
the district court conducted a proper inquiry, Dr. Fulero's knowledge likely would have been
found to be scientific and should have been admitted. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306,
315 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 (noting that "[t]his court concurred at
trial with [Smithers] . . . that Fulero's methods satisfied the reliability prong ofDaubert" because
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that this evidence fulfilled the second prong of the Daubert test by aiding the
jury in reaching a verdict. 58
Next, the court noted the circuit split on the issue of whether admitting
eyewitness-expert testimony violated Rule 403, but ultimately decided that the
probative value of eyewitness-expert testimony, at least in this case, was not
substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.' 5 9 The court also discussed
the Eleventh Circuit's unfavorable stance toward eyewitness-expert testimony,
but concluded that the Eleventh Circuit ultimately left the decision to admit
such testimony to the discretion of the trial court.'60 The district court in Smith
thus felt free to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert and abandon
the Eleventh Circuit's traditional resistance toward eyewitness-expert
testimony. 61 The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama joined the minority of jurisdictions to admit eyewitness-expert
testimony.162
III. UNITED STATES V. SMITH GETS IT RIGHT
A. The Heightened Risk ofMisidentification in United States v. Smith
Eyewitness experts provide a valuable legal service by educating jurors on
issues outside of their knowledge.163 However, trial courts habitually exclude
eyewitness experts and appellate courts often affirm these exclusions.164
Appellate courts allow trial courts too much discretion in excluding eyewitness
experts. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
his testimony consisted of scientific knowledge). Similarly, in the Sixth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Smith, it determined that Dr. Fulero's knowledge was scientific, and the
prosecution admitted that Dr. Fulero was an expert under Rule 702, but the court declined to
overturn its exclusion on other grounds. United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105-07 (6th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
158. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1213-14, 1218-19. The court noted that many factors
examined in Dr. Fulero's testimony were counterintuitive and, therefore, his testimony assisted
the jury in understanding human perception and how various factors affect eyewitness
identifications. Id. at 1215.
159. Id. at 1219-21. Because the jury is often unaware of the factors that affect eyewitness
identifications, the court discussed the probative value of such testimony. Id. at 1220-21.
Additionally, the court noted that it was difficult to see the prejudicial effect such testimony had
because it assisted the jury in coming to a more informed decision. Id at 1221.
160. Id at 1210-11.
161. Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit had never before admitted eyewitness-expert
testimony, the court admitted the evidence because the Eleventh Circuit's language, at least in the
Smith decision, placed the determination to admit within the discretion of the trial court. Id.
Therefore, the court could depart from the typical holding of the Eleventh Circuit-excluding
eyewitness-expert testimony-while following Eleventh Circuit precedent. Id.
162. See id. at 1209-10.
163. See supra Part I.C.
164. See supra Part I.D.
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should be an example to other courts for its approach to eyewitness-expert
testimony.
The Smith court recognized the danger of eyewitness testimony
unaccompanied by experts who could dispel the myths that the average person
165believes regarding eyewitness testimony.1 . In robbery convictions, as in
Smith, the importance of an eyewitness expert is heightened.1 66 The University
of Michigan study that found robberies, although very common offenses, are at
a higher risk than other crimes for eyewitness misidentification because
robberies are often committed by strangers to the victim and the robber is
usually within the victim's physical proximity only briefly.' 6 7  Further,
robberies usually do not leave much DNA evidence, at least compared with
rapes and murders.168 An accurate technology does not exist with the
capability to identify perpetrators of robberies or rule out innocent persons the
way DNA evidence does in rape and murder cases.169 Once a misidentification
results in a conviction, it is much less likely that the robber will be
exonerated.170
In Smith, the danger of misidentification was even more acute because there
was no other corroborating evidence. Even courts highly critical of
eyewitness-expert testimony have stated that they would consider admitting the
testimony if there was no other corroborating evidence.172 In Smith, all of the
dangers of which the University of Michigan study warned were present: the
case at issue was a robbery, the two eyewitnesses did not know the defendant,
and the two eyewitnesses had limited exposure to the defendant during the
robbery. 173 Therefore, the heightened risk of misidentifications in robberies,
coupled with the lowered availability of other evidence, illustrates why the
Smith court's admittance of Dr. Fulero's testimony was so vital in this case.174
B. The Eyewitness Expert Fulfills the Requirements ofRule 702
When applying the Daubert test, the court followed the growing trend of
holdings that eyewitness-expert testimony is scientific knowledge under
Daubert.175 The second prong of the Daubert test-whether the evidence aids
165. See Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1209 (discussing the alarming combination of high
reliance on eyewitness testimony and high inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony).
166. See Gross et al., supra note 4, at 530.
167. Id
168. Id. at 529 tbl.3, 530.
169. Id. at 530-31.
170. Id.
171. Supplemental Brief, supra note 142.
172. See supra note I18.
173. United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1214-15 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
174. See supra Part 11.
175. See supra note 157; see also United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.
1986) (discussing the rising level of acceptance of the validity of eyewitness-expert testimony);
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the jury in understanding the issuesl76 -is best discussed in conjunction with
Rule 403.177
C. The Benefits of the Eyewitness-Expert Testimony Outweighs Any Prejudice
or Confusion
1. The Benefit ofDebunking Frequently Held, Yet False, Beliefs About
Eyewitness Testimony
For the trial in Smith, Dr. Fulero testified as to a number of the factors that
affect eyewitness identification.178 He discussed research that has shown that
confidence of eyewitness identification and accuracy of eyewitness
identification are, at best, weakly correlated.179 The weak correlation became
particularly important in this case when the eyewitnesses reported high
confidence levels in identifying the defendant as the bank robber.1so Dr.
Fulero also testified that stress can negatively affect one's memory. 8 At least
one of the eyewitnesses in this case reported that the bank robbery was a
stressful event; she described it as "the most traumatic experience of her
life."' 82 Additionally, Dr. Fulero testified that cross-racial identifications are
more error-prone than same-race identifications. Once again, this testimony
was highly relevant in this case because one of the eyewitnesses who testified
was Caucasian and the defendant was African American.184
Dr. Fulero also testified regarding the effects of post-event information on
one's memory.' 85 He discussed that new information, introduced between the
Supplemental Brief, supra note 142, at 3 (discussing the history of admitting eyewitness-expert
testimony and the fact that courts are gradually becoming more accepting of it).
176. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
177. See United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing how the
helpfulness element of the Rule 702 inquiry is interrelated with the Rule 403 inquiry and how it
was unclear under which rule the lower court excluded the eyewitness-expert testimony). Many
of the factors weighed in determining whether the testimony assisted the trier of fact would be the
same as the factors weighed to determine the probative value of such testimony. See Linda E.
Cafter, Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases in California: Retire
Kelly-Frye and Return to a Traditional Analysis, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1103, 1137-38 (1989).
Therefore, although a court would need to consider the second prong of the Daubert test before
moving on to consider the Rule 403 issue, for the purpose of this Note, the issues are best
discussed together.
178. See Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1215-18.
179. Id. at 1217-18; see Cutler et al., supra note 68, at 246.
180. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
181. Id. at 1216; see Clifford & Hollin, supra note 74, at 368 (concluding that stress could
greatly impair one's recollection of events).
182. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
183. Id. at 1215-16; see Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 74, at 145 (concluding that
cross-racial identifications were less reliable than same-race identifications).
184. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
185. Id. at 1216.
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time that the event is witnessed and the time that the information is recalled,
can affect memories of the event. 86 In this case, the fact that the two
eyewitnesses spoke to each other before they identified the defendant in court
is relevant.'8 They admitted that they possibly discussed the defendant's
physical appearance with each other.'8 This is significant considering that
one's memory is highly susceptible to suggestibility in the time between
witnessing an event and recalling that eyewitness event.189 Therefore,
discussing the appearance of the assailant together during the impressionable
time lapse potentially altered the eyewitnesses' memories.
Without Dr. Fulero's testimony educating the jury about the relationship
between confidence and accuracy and about the effects that stress, the races of
the eyewitness and the perpetrator, and post-event information can have on the
eyewitness identification, it is likely that the jury would hold the same
misperceptions that participants in research studies have held: eyewitnesses'
certainty in their identifications is indisputable proof that the defendant is
guilty;I o cross-racial identifications are as accurate as same-race
identifications;1 91 and memory remains constant over time, despite the
introduction of new information.192 In reality, none of these statements is
true. 193
Two factors that Dr. Fulero did not mention in his testimony-but are
nevertheless relevant-are the presence of a weapon during a crime and the
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1217. Further, at least one of the eyewitnesses did not identify the defendant until
two weeks after the robbery had occurred. Supplemental Brief, supra note 142, at 10. The long
period of time between the robbery and the identification allows for more information to be
introduced that alters the eyewitness's recollection of the event and the perpetrator. See LOFTUS,
DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 58-59 (stating that exposure to true information in the
post-event period can prevent forgetting while exposure to false information can distort or alter
the original memory).
188. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
189. See LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 58-59 (explaining the malleability of
memory relating to post-event periods).
190. See Cutler et al., supra note 64, at 222 (finding that jurors were not aware that
confidence was a poor indicator of accuracy in eyewitness identifications); Cutler et al., supra
note 67, at 189-90 (finding that study participants heavily weighed the eyewitness's confidence
in her identification when determining the accuracy of the identification); Schmechel et al., supra
note 64, at 198-99 (finding that study participants believed that confidence was a good indicator
of accuracy in eyewitness identifications).
191. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 200.
192. Id at 196.
193. See Cutler et al., supra note 68, at 246-47 (finding that confidence in eyewitness
identification and accuracy of eyewitness identification are only weakly correlated); Shapiro &
Penrod, supra note 74, at 145 (concluding that cross-racial identifications were less reliable than
same-race identifications); see also LOFTUS, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 58-59 (finding
that memories are highly susceptible to suggestibility between when the event is viewed and
recalled).
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deterioration of memory as time passes.' 94  Research has shown that if a
weapon is present during a crime, eyewitnesses are more likely to focus on the
weapon, thereby producing less accurate identifications of the assailant.' 95
Smith was convicted of armed robbery, meaning that a weapon was present
while the eyewitnesses observed the assailant. 196
Research has also found that one's memory and ability to be an accurate
eyewitness declines over time. 97 In this case, two weeks passed between the
bank robbery and the eyewitness identification of the defendant.198 The longer
the period of time between the crime and the eyewitness identification, the
greater the chance of a false identification.199
The effects of one's level of confidence,200 the level of stress,20' the presence
of a weapon,202 the time elapsed between the eyewitness event and the memory
203recollection, the information introduced between the eyewitness event and
the memory recollection,204 and the races of the victim and the assailant205
have on eyewitness memories are often counterintuitive to the average juror.
Therefore, expert testimony that informs the jury of these factors' effects not
206
only aids the jury but also, in most cases, is necessary to provide a fair trial.
Expert testimony was particularly helpful in Smith because all of the
aforementioned factors were present, the crime was a robbery, and there was
no other evidence to corroborate the eyewitness identifications.207 Therefore,
the eyewitness expert aided the jury in Smith, fulfilling the second prong of the
Daubert test, and the testimony was highly probative.
194. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213-18 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(discussing the subjects that Dr. Fulero mentioned in his testimony). However, defense counsel's
brief, arguing that the court should deny the prosecution's motion to exclude Dr. Fulero's
testimony, stated that weapon focus is one of the issues about which Dr. Fulero would testify.
Supplemental Brief. supra note 142, at 9. It is unclear whether Dr. Fulero testified regarding
weapon focus, and the court failed to incorporate this testimony and information into its decision.
195. See Cutler et al., supra note 68, at 244; Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 196.
196. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
197. Krafka & Penrod, supra note 74, at 65.
198. Supplemental Brief, supra note 142, at 10.
199. See LOFTUs, DOYLE & DYSART, supra note 5, at 65 (stating that memory deteriorates as
time passes); Krafka & Penrod, supra note 74, at 65 (reporting that reduced memory performance
in identifications resulted from the passage of time).
200. Schmechel et al., supra note 64, at 198-99.
201. Id at 197-98.
202. Id. at 196-97.
203. Id. at 195-96.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 200.
206. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209, 1213-14 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(stating that eyewitness-expert testimony aids the jury in understanding that eyewitness testimony
can lead to a high rate of increased convictions).
207. See id at 1209, 1215-18; Supplemental Brief, supra note 142.
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2. Any Prejudice Created By Eyewitness Experts Is Minor
Courts that have held that eyewitness-expert testimony was inadmissible
because it violated Rule 403 found that such testimony was highly prejudicial
and confused the jury.208  The First Circuit in United States v. Fosher
expressed concern that eyewitness experts created an "aura of special
reliability and trustworthiness," which caused jurors to accept the expert's
testimony of the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications as an instruction to
209disregard any eyewitness testimony.
As the Third Circuit pointed out in United States v. Mathis, this concern is
unfounded. In that case, the court stated that there was no reason to believe
that jurors would weigh eyewitness-expert testimony more heavily than any
other expert testimony. o Just as a juror would weigh the expert testimony of
a doctor regarding common symptoms of an illness to determine whether the
patient had the illness, so too would the juror weigh the testimony of an
eyewitness expert regarding the relevant factors to determine whether the
eyewitness gave an accurate identification.211
212
Smith bolsters the point advanced in Mathis. The court admitted the
eyewitness-expert testimony and allowed Dr. Fulero to testify.213 And yet, the
jury still oonvicted Smith. 214 Allowing eyewitness experts to testify does not
hand the case to the defendant. Rather, it merely provides all of the
information necessary for the jury to make an informed decision. 215
Further, as the court in Smith noted, eyewitness experts do not confuse, but
rather clarify the situation and give the jury a complete picture of the events
and the factors affecting those events. Research has shown that juries that
hear eyewitness-expert testimony discuss the eyewitness testimony longer, as
217
well as examine all other evidence more critically.21 Opponents of
eyewitness-expert testimony argue that juries hand over all decision-making
power to the expert witness and substitute the expert's opinion for their own
judgments, but in reality, eyewitness-expert testimony makes jurors more
effective by causing them to examine critically each aspect of the case.
208. See supra Part 1.D.2.
209. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979).
210. See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339 (3d Cir. 2001).
211. See id
212. See Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
213. Id at 1208-09.
214. Id. at 1209.
215. Id at 1222 ("[T]he jury, in assessing the evidence and reaching its verdict, had
important and practical information that it would otherwise not have been [able] to use.").
216. See id at 1218-19.
217. Hosch et al., supra note 91, at 293-94.
218. See id at 294.
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Finally, in order to exclude evidence, Rule 403 requires the benefits of the
evidence to be "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial effect. 21 9 Even if
eyewitness-expert testimony is prejudicial, the level of prejudice is not high
enough to substantially outweigh the many benefits of the testimony.220
3. Other Safeguards That Prevent Any Prejudicial Effect
The court in Smith achieved the right balance by using limiting instructions
to counter the ill effects of misidentification while reducing the prejudicial
effects of eyewitness-expert testimony.221 Although the court allowed Dr.
Fulero to testify about eyewitness identifications in general and the factors that
affected accuracy of identifications, it prohibited him from commenting on or
sharing his opinion regarding the specific witnesses in the Smith case.222
Limiting instructions allow testimony to be admitted and the expert to testify
regarding the flaws of eyewitness identification. At the same time, it preserves
a sphere of credibility determination solely for the jury. Although the expert
can present his knowledge on the topic, the jury decides how that knowledge
applies to the particular witnesses and facts in the case before it.
Courts that exclude eyewitness-expert testimony have stated that it is
unnecessary because cross-examination and jury instructions can fully combat
the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications. Research has refuted this
argument by showing that neither cross-examination nor jury instructions are
effective in overcoming the overwhelming persuasiveness of eyewitness
identification because jurors are mostly ignorant of the various factors that
affect eyewitness identification. 224
219. FED. R. EVID. 403.
220. See supra Part L.C.
221. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
222. Id. at 1209.
223. See United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rincon, 28
F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979).
224. See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 143-58, 255-68. For example, if a court
excludes eyewitness-expert testimony and states, as one of its reasons for doing so, that
cross-examination and jury instructions will suffice to counter any dangers of misidentification,
as the Eighth Circuit did in Kime, 99 F.3d at 335, then the defense attorney can ask the witness
various questions such as how confident the eyewitness is in her identification, how much time
passed between the crime and when the eyewitness identified the defendant as the assailant,
whether there was a weapon present, and whether the eyewitness felt stressed during the crime.
The problem, however, is that the answers to these questions have a counterintuitive effect on
eyewitness identification. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text. If the defendant
answers that she was extremely stressed during the crime, the jury might conclude that her
identification was more reliable, rather than less. Therefore, cross-examination, which is not
accompanied by an explanation as to why particular questions were asked, is not adequate to
combat the dangers of misidentifications. See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 157.
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4. The Court Follows Eleventh Circuit Precedent
The court in Smith explained how its ruling did not contradict Eleventh
Circuit precedent,225 despite the disfavor the Eleventh Circuit has shown
toward eyewitness-expert testimony. 226 The latest Eleventh Circuit opinion on
eyewitness-expert testimony used much more nuanced language than previous
Eleventh Circuit cases had, which suggested that the court was open to
considering admitting expert eyewitness testimony.227 Further, the Eleventh
Circuit emphasized that the decision of admitting eyewitness-expert testimony
fell squarely within the discretion of the trial judge.228 Therefore, the district
court in Smith was able to admit eyewitness-expert testimony without breaking
from Eleventh Circuit precedent.
229
IV. CONCLUSION
There is much confusion surrounding eyewitnesses and the factors that
affect eyewitness identifications. This is a dangerous issue when lay jurors
rely so heavily upon such evidence. In order to lower the number of wrongful
convictions based on eyewitness identifications, the court system needs to
recognize, as the court did in United States v. Smith, that eyewitness experts
often meet the requirements set out in Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403,
and that such experts play a vital role in producing a fair judicial process.
Therefore, the appellate courts should grant the lower courts less discretion in
excluding eyewitness-expert testimony.
225. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-11.
226. See supra Part I.E.
227. Compare United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(refusing to state unequivocally that eyewitness experts would never be allowed to testify), with
United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating unequivocally that
eyewitness-expert testimony was not admissible in the Eleventh Circuit).
228. Smith, 122 F.3d at 1359.
229. See Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-11.
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